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Abstract—Elliptic curve cryptography has received great attention
in recent years due to its high resistance against modern cryptanalysis.
The aim of this article is to present efficient generators to generate
substitution boxes (S-boxes) and pseudo random numbers which are
essential for many well-known cryptosystems. These generators are
based on a special class of ordered Mordell elliptic curves. Rigorous
analyses are performed to test the security strength of the proposed
generators. For a given prime, the experimental results reveal that
the proposed generators are capable of generating a large number of
distinct, mutually uncorrelated, cryptographically strong S-boxes and
sequences of random numbers in low time and space complexity.
Furthermore, it is evident from the comparison that the proposed
schemes can efficiently generate secure S-boxes and random numbers
as compared to some of the well-known existing schemes over
different mathematical structures.
Key words—Mordell Elliptic Curve, Substitution Box, Random
Number, Ordered Set
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advancements in the field of communication systems
and computational methods necessitate improvements in the
traditional cryptosystems. Substitution box (S-box) and pseudo
random number generator (PRNG) play an important role
in many cryptosystems such as Data Encryption Standard
(DES) [1], Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [2], Twofish
security system [3], Blowfish cryptosystem [4], International
Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) [5] and the cryptosystems
developed in [6]–[9]. It has been pointed out by many re-
searchers that the security of a cryptosystem can be improved
by using dynamic S-boxes instead of a single static S-box, see
for example [10]–[15]. This fact necessitates the development
of new S-box generators which can generate a large number
of distinct and mutually uncorrelated S-boxes with high cryp-
tographic properties in low time and space complexity [16].
Many researchers have proposed improved S-box generators
and PRNGs to enhance the security of data against modern
cryptanalysis. These improvements are mainly based on finite
field arithmetic and chaotic systems. Khan and Azam [17],
[18] developed two different methods to generate 256 cryp-
tographically strong S-boxes by using Gray codes, and affine
mapping. Jakimoski and Kocarev [19] used chaotic maps to
develop a four-step method for the generation of an S-box.
O¨zkaynak and O¨zer [20] introduced a new method based
Corresponding author
N. A. Azam is a research fellow at the Department of Applied Mathemat-
ics and Physics, Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Japan.
This research is partially funded through JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number
18J23484. (e-mail: azam@amp.i.kyoto-u.ac.jp).
on a chaotic system to develop secure S-boxes. Unlike the
traditional use of chaotic maps, Wang et al. [21] proposed an
efficient algorithm to construct S-boxes using gnetic algorithm
and chaotic maps. Yin et al. [22] proposed an S-box design
technique using iteration of the chaotic maps. Tang and
Liao [23] constructed S-boxes based on an iterating discretized
chaotic map. Lambic´ [24] used a special type of discrete
chaotic map to obtain bijective S-boxes. O¨zkaynak et al. [25]
proposed a new S-box based on a fractional order chaotic
Chen system. Zhang et al. [26] used I-Ching operators for the
construction of highly non-linear S-boxes, and the proposed
approach is very efficient.
Similarly, chaotic systems are used to generate pseudo
random numbers (PRNs), see for example [27]–[31]. Fran-
cois et al. [27] presented a PRNG based on chaotic maps
to construct multiple key sequences. Patidar and Sud [28]
designed a PRNG with optimal cryptographic properties using
chaotic logistic maps. Guyeux et al. [29] developed a chaotic
PRNG with the properties of topological chaos which offers
sufficient security for cryptographic purposes. Stojanovski and
Kocarev [30] analyzed a PRNG based on a piecewise linear
one dimensional chaotic map. Fan et al. [31] proposed a PRNG
using generalized Henon map, and a novel technique is used
to improve the characteristics of the proposed sequences.
It has been pointed out by Jia et al. [7] that the PRNs
generated by a chaotic system can have small period due to the
hardware computation issues and revealed that elliptic curve
(EC) has high security than chaotic system. However, the com-
putation over ECs is usually performed by group law which is
computationally inefficient. Hayat and Azam [6] proposed an
efficient S-box generator and a PRNG based on ECs by using a
total order as an alternative to group law. This S-box generator
is efficient than the other methods over ECs, however their
time and space complexity are O(p2) and O(p), respectively,
where p is the prime of the underlying EC. Furthermore the S-
box generator does not guarantee the generation of an S-box.
The PRNG proposed by Hayat and Azam [6] also takes O(p2)
and O(p) time and space, respectively, to generate a sequence
of pseudo random numbers (SPRNs) of size m ≤ p. Azam
et al. [16] proposed an improved S-box generation method to
generate bijective S-boxes by using ordered Mordell elliptic
curves (MECs). The main advantage of this method is that its
time and space complexity are O(mp) and O(m), respectively,
where m is the size of an S-box. Azam et al. [32] proposed
another S-box generator to generate m × n, where m ≤ n
injective S-boxes which can generate a large number of distinct
and mutually uncorrelated S-boxes by using the concept of
isomorphism on ECs. The time and space complexity of this
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2method are O(2np) and O(2n), where n ≤ p and is the size
of co-domain of the resultant S-box. A common draw back
of these S-box generators is that the cryptographic properties
of their optimal S-boxes are far from the theoretical optimal
values.
The aim of this paper is to propose an efficient S-box
generator and a PRNG based on an ordered MEC to gen-
erate a large number of distinct, mutually uncorrelated S-
boxes and PRNs with optimal cryptographic properties in low
time and space complexity to overcome the above mentioned
drawbacks. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In
Section II basic definitions are discussed. The proposed S-box
generator is described in Section III. Section IV consists of
security analysis and comparison of the S-box generator. The
proposed algorithm for generating PRNs and some general
results are given in Section V. The proposed SPRNs are
analyzed in Section VI, while Section VII concludes the whole
paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, we denote a finite set {0, 1, . . . ,m−
1} simply by [0,m−1]. A finite field over a prime number p is
the set [0, p−1] denoted by Fp with binary operations addition
and multiplication under modulo p. A non-zero integer α ∈ Fp
is said to be quadratic residue (QR) if there exists an integer
β ∈ Fp such that α ≡ β2 (mod p). A non-zero integer in Fp
which is not QR is said to be quadratic non-residue (QNR).
For a prime p, non-negative a ∈ Fp and positive b ∈ Fp, the
EC Ep,a,b over a finite field Fp is defined to be the collection
of identity element∞ and ordered pairs (x, y) ∈ Fp×Fp such
that
y2 ≡ x3 + ax+ b (mod p).
In this setting, we call p, a and b the parameters of Ep,a,b.
The number #Ep,a,b of all such points can be calculated using
Hasse’s theorem [34]
|#Ep,a,b − p− 1| ≤ 2√p.
Two ECs Ep,a,b and Ep,a′,b′ over Fp are isomorphic if and
only if there exists a non-zero integer t ∈ Fp such that a′t4 ≡
a (mod p) and b′t6 ≡ b (mod p). In this case, t is called
isomorphism parameter between the ECs Ep,a,b and Ep,a′,b′ .
For an isomorphism parameter t, each point (x, y) ∈ Ep,a,b is
mapped on (t2x, t3y) ∈ Ep,a′,b′ . Note that an isomorphism is
an equivalence relation on all ECs over Fp, and therefore all
ECs can be divided into equivalence classes [32]. For the sake
of simplicity we represent an arbitrary class by Ci and assume
that the class C1 contains the EC Ep,0,1. A non-negative integer
b ∈ Fp such that Ep,a,b ∈ Ci is called representative R(p, Ci)
of the class Ci. Clearly, it holds that R(p, C1) = 1.
An EC Ep,a,b with a = 0 is said to be a Mordel elliptic
curve. The following theorem is from [34, 6.6 (c), p. 188].
Theorem 1. Let p > 3 be a prime such that p ≡ 2 (mod 3).
For each non-zero b ∈ Fp, the MEC Ep,0,b has exactly p+ 1
distinct points, and has each integer from [0, p − 1] exactly
once as a y-coordinate.
Furthermore, by [32, Lemma 1] it follows that there are only
two classes of MECs when p ≡ 2 (mod 3). Henceforth, we
denote an MEC Ep,0,b by simply Ep,b and the term MEC
stands for an MEC Ep,b such that p ≡ 2 (mod 3).
For a subset A of [0, p−1] and an ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺),
we define a total order ≺∗ on A w.r.t. the ordered MEC such
that for any two elements a1, a2 ∈ A it holds that a1 ≺∗ a2
if and only if (x1, a1) ≺ (x2, a2). For any two non-negative
integers p and m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ p, we define an (m, p)-
complete set to be a set Q of size m such that for each element
q ∈ Q, it holds that 0 ≤ q ≤ p − 1, and no two elements of
Q are congruent with each other under modulo m, i.e., for
each q, q′ ∈ Q, it holds that (q 6≡ q′) (mod m). We denote
an ordered set A with a total order ≺ by an ordered pair
(A,≺). Let (A,≺) be an ordered set, for any two elements
a, a′ ∈ A such that a ≺ a′, we read as a is smaller than
a′ or a′ is greater than a w.r.t. the order ≺. For simplicity,
we represent the elements of (A,≺) in the form of a non-
decreasing sequence and ai denotes the i-th element of the
ordered set in its sequence representation. For an ordered MEC
(Ep,b,≺) and an (m, p)-complete set Y , we define the ordered
(m, p)-complete set Y ∗ with ordering ≺˜ due to Y and ≺ such
that for any two element y1, y2 ∈ Y ∗ with y′1 ≡ y1 (mod m)
and y′2 ≡ y2 (mod m), where y′1, y′2 ∈ Y , it holds that y1≺˜y2
if and only if (x1, y′1) ≺ (x2, y′2).
For a given MEC Ep,b, Azam et al. [16] defined three typical
type of orderings natural N , diffusion D and modulo diffusion
M ordering based on the coordinates of the points on Ep,b as
(x1, y1)N(x2, y2)⇔
either x1 < x2, orx1 = x2 and y1 < y2;
(x1, y1)D(x2, y2)⇔
either x1 + y1 < x2 + y2, orx1 + y1 = x2 + y2 and x1 < x2;
(x1, y1)M(x2, y2)⇔either (x1 + y1 < x2 + y2) (mod p), orx1 + y1 ≡ x2 + y2 (mod p) and x1 < x2.
III. THE PROPOSED S-BOX CONSTRUCTION SCHEME
For an ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺), an (m, p)-complete set Y
and a non-negative integer k ≤ m − 1, we define an (m, p)-
complete S-box σ(p, b,≺, Y, k) due to (Ep,b,≺), Y and k to
be a mapping from [0,m− 1] to (Y ∗, ≺˜) such that σ(p, b,≺,
Y, k)(i) = y(i+k) (mod m) (mod m), where y(i+k) (mod m)
is the (i + k) (mod m)-th element of the ordered (m, p)-
complete set (Y ∗, ≺˜) in its sequence representation.
Lemma 2. For any ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺), an (m, p)-
complete set Y and a non-negative integer k ≤ m − 1, the
(m, p)-complete S-box σ(p, b,≺, Y, k) is a bijection.
Proof. Suppose on contrary that there exist i, j ∈ [0,m −
1] such that σp,b,≺,Y,k(i) = σp,b,≺,Y,k(j). This implies that
y′i = y
′
j , where y
′
i ≡ yi (mod m) and y′j ≡ yj (mod m) and
y′i, y
′
j ∈ Y . This leads to a contradiction to the fact that Y
is an (m, p)-complete set. Thus, σ(p, b,≺, Y, k) is a one-one
3mapping on the finite sets of same order, and hence it is a
bijection. 
For prime p = 52511 and m = 256, an (256, 52511)-
complete subset Y of the MEC is given in Table I, while
the (256, 52511)-complete S-box σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) due to
the ordered MEC (E52511,1, N) is presented in Table II in
hexagonal format. Each entry of Table II is obtained from
the corresponding entry of Table I by applying modulo 256
operator.
TABLE II
THE PROPOSED (256, 52511)-COMPLETE S-BOX σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0)
92 5C F5 C5 21 4D A2 A3 4B 90 7D 6A 11 9D 91 35
8D 25 36 54 1E 47 20 CA 89 C4 50 EF C3 A7 70 56
8A 5E 32 0 0A D0 1C 42 DF 48 FC 18 FB 1B 2D CC
86 53 D2 14 5B 2B F1 27 D4 A6 78 76 CB 5 BE 8F
9E 83 F4 C0 C2 2 40 DE 45 EC B3 D9 D5 5F 61 E8
34 31 6B E4 74 23 AA 75 37 6F 99 2E AD F9 79 82
9A 55 67 29 BC 0E 0D 12 57 30 17 A4 F7 8B DB AC
3 6D E9 80 B2 E1 D1 D8 ED 77 4E 3F B8 94 D3 95
0F 0B 1A C7 A1 63 BB EA BA B9 41 98 60 7C 2F AE
26 A8 D6 CE CD 6C BD 9F 4C F2 A5 28 64 24 AF 66
87 1 84 3D 59 4 3E 51 7B FF E7 65 88 58 2A E6
5A B6 43 6 6E C9 A9 AB 7A 7 4A 7F 15 BF FA B5
96 38 71 62 F3 B1 4F DD 85 44 DC 69 5D C6 49 E2
DA 8C 13 D7 8E 7E C8 EB EE 97 FE E0 93 9C E5 1D
F0 73 E3 0C 8 52 3A 72 2C CF 68 9 22 39 1F FD
C1 3B F6 46 B4 A0 9B F8 19 81 B0 10 33 16 B7 3C
Next we present two efficient algorithms to compute an
(m, p)-complete S-box. The first algorithm is based on Theo-
rem 1.
Algorithm 1 Constructing the proposed S-box
Input: An ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺), an (m, p)-complete set Y
and a non-negative integer k ≤ m− 1.
Output: The proposed (m, p)-complete S-box σ(p, b,≺,
Y, k).
1: A := ∅; /*A set containing the points of Ep,b with y-
coordinates from Y */
2: for each y ∈ Y do
3: B := [0, p− 1]; t := No;
4: while q = No do
5: x ∈ B;
6: if (x3 + b− y2 ≡ 0) (mod p) then
7: q := Yes; A := A ∪ {(x, y)}
8: end if;
9: B := B \ {x}
10: end while
11: end for;
12: Sort Y ∗ := [0,m − 1] w.r.t. the element of A, i.e., sort
Y ∗ w.r.t. the ordering ≺˜;
13: pi := (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(m− 1));
14: for each integer i ∈ [0,m− 1] do
15: pi(i) := y(i+k) (mod m) (mod m), where
y(i+k) (mod m) is the (i + k) (mod m)-th element of
the ordered (m, p)-complete set (Y ∗, ≺˜)
16: end for;
17: Output pi as the (m, p)-complete S-box σ(p, b,≺, Y, k).
Lemma 3. For an ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺), an (m, p)-
complete set Y and a non-negative integer k ≤ m − 1,
the (m, p)-complete S-box σ(p, b,≺, Y, k) can be computed
in O(mp) time and O(m) space by using Algorithm 1.
Proof. In Algorithm 1 there is for-loop of size m over the
elements of Y , which has a nested while-loop to compute the
subset A of the MEC such that the points in A has y-coordinate
in Y . This step is necessary to compute the ordered (m, p)-
complete set (Y ∗, ≺˜) due to Y and ≺. Note that the nested
while-loop will iterate for at most p-times, since by Theorem 1,
for each y ∈ [0, p−1] there is a unique x ∈ [0, p−1] such that
(x3+b−y2 ≡ 0) (mod p). Thus, this for-loop and while-loop
take O(mp) time in the worst case, while the sorting of Y ∗
takes O(m logm) time. Finally, there is another independent
for-loop of size m to compute the sequence pi which takes
O(m) time. Thus, Algorithm 1 takes O(mp)+O(m logm)+
O(m) time to execute in the worst case. By using the fact
that mp > m log p, since log p < p and m ≤ p and by the
property of O notation, the time complexity of Algorithm 1 is
O(mp). Furthermore, Algorithm 1 only stores sets of size m,
and therefore its space complexity is O(m). This completes
the proof. 
Next we present another algorithm for the generation of
(m, p)-complete S-boxes on a fixed MEC. For this we prove
the following results.
For a fixed ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺), a positive integer m ≤ p
and an integer 0 ≤ k ≤ m−1, let Num(Ep,b,≺,m, k) denote
the total number of (m, p)-complete S-boxes, possibly with
repetition, generated due to the ordered MEC, m and k.
Lemma 4. For a fixed ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺) and a positive
integer m ≤ p, the total number of (m, p)-complete S-boxes,
possibly with repetition, generated due to the MEC is equal
to m(q + 1)rqm−r, where p = mq + r, 0 ≤ r < m, and
0 ≤ k ≤ m− 1.
Proof. For a fixed integer 0 ≤ k ≤ m − 1, it holds by the
definition of (m, p)-complete S-box that the total number of
(m, p)-complete S-boxes, possibly with repetition, generated
due to the ordered MEC, m and k is equal to the number of
distinct (m, p)-complete sets. If p = mq + r, where 0 ≤ r ≤
m−1, then there are q+ 1 (resp., q) integers ` (resp., h) such
that ` (mod m) ∈ [0, r− 1] (resp., h (mod m) ∈ [r,m− 1]).
Thus, to construct an (m, p)-complete set there are q+1 (resp.,
q) choices of an integers a such that a (mod m) ∈ [0, r − 1]
(resp., [r,m − 1]). This implies that there are (q + 1)rqm−r
distinct (m, p)-complete sets. Hence, the number of (m, p)-
complete S-boxes due to the MEC is m(q + 1)rqm−r, since
0 ≤ k ≤ m− 1. 
Observation 5. For any subset F of an MEC Ep,b there exists
a unique subset F ′ of either MEC Ep,R(p,C1) or Ep,R(p,C2)
and a unique integer t ∈ [1, (p − 1)/2] such that for each
(x, y) ∈ F there exists a unique point (x′, y′) ∈ F ′ for which
it holds that x ≡ t2x′ (mod p) and y ≡ t3y′ (mod p).
It is important to mention that for each subset F such that the
set of y-coordinates of its points is an (m, p)-complete set, the
set of y-coordinates of the points of F ′ is not necessarily be
an (m, p)-complete set. This is explained in Example 1.
Example 1. Let F be a subset of E11,9 with an (11, 10)-
complete set Y = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9} of y-coordinates,
where m = 10. Then for t = 2, there exists F ′ ⊂ E11,1 with
4TABLE I
THE (256, 52511)-COMPLETE SET Y
A792 4A5C 9AF5 01C5 421 814D B3A2 5CA3 834B 9F90 1C7D BF6A 0A11 7A9D 9E91 6135
1D8D 9425 3F36 7954 1E1E 5B47 1420 71CA 8089 80C4 3150 12EF 36C3 BEA7 6170 2256
298A 005E 8032 0F00 270A 51D0 421C 942 6BDF 2848 87FC 4418 2BFB 121B 6F2D 11CC
886 8E53 6BD2 AC14 B65B 062B 37F1 B627 47D4 59A6 2878 7D76 76CB 7005 0CBE 8F8F
609E 7A83 61F4 23C0 3AC2 3502 BC40 88DE 3645 2EEC B8B3 BBD9 84D5 165F C061 0BE8
AE34 6431 906B 15E4 BE74 5423 10AA 4D75 B037 556F 6F99 242E 31AD C9F9 A679 3F82
749A 7F55 9267 AF29 33BC 1A0E 270D 2312 7857 B730 5C17 AAA4 7DF7 698B 7FDB 66AC
A203 B46D 7DE9 7E80 72B2 97E1 70D1 18D8 76ED 4677 7A4E 7F3F 96B8 8A94 91D3 8295
6E0F 7A0B 221A 11C7 A7A1 1563 33BB 15EA 62BA 0EB9 8041 6998 C260 127C 0B2F 38AE
7626 12A8 50D6 B0CE 67CD 766C 22BD 109F 4E4C CBF2 5CA5 2528 1964 4724 CAAF 966
A587 AE01 5584 0A3D 3859 7504 063E 5251 767B 0AFF 50E7 7765 2688 BC58 972A 0EE6
295A 0BB6 4B43 5906 476E C5C9 20A9 45AB C57A 1D07 694A B57F 0D15 1CBF ABFA C3B5
2096 B138 A671 A262 BAF3 4CB1 054F C5DD 9B85 C144 BBDC 7969 C85D 91C6 0A49 9DE2
C6DA 278C 1C13 29D7 708E 827E 0FC8 4FEB 4BEE 1F97 20FE 26E0 0E93 4E9C A2E5 841D
ADF0 B273 A6E3 440C AB08 3952 103A A472 C42C 36CF 9768 6809 0E22 C439 291F AEFD
A7C1 C23B 2FF6 A046 3BB4 ACA0 5A9B 95F8 7919 4381 A9B0 7110 7433 1816 39B7 1A3C
y-coordinates from the set Y ′ = {0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}
which is not an (11, 10)-complete set.
By Observation 5, we can avoid the while-loop used in
Algorithm 1 to find x-coordinate for each element y in an
(m, p)-complete set Y .
Algorithm 2 Constructing the proposed S-box using the
EC isomorphism
Input: An MEC Ep,R(p,Ci), where i ∈ {1, 2}, multiplicative
inverse t−1 of t in Fp, where t ∈ [1, (p − 1)/2], a total
order ≺ on the MEC Ep,t6R(p,Ci), an (m, p)-complete set
Y and an integer k ≤ m− 1.
Output: The proposed (m, p)-complete S-box
σ(p, t6R(p, Ci),≺, Y, k).
1: A := ∅; /*A set containing the points of Ep,t6R(p,Ci) with
y-coordinates from the set Y */
2: for each y ∈ Y do
3: y′ := (t−1)3y;
4: Find x ∈ [0, p− 1] such that (x, y) ∈ Ep,R(p,Ci);
5: A := A ∪ {(t2x, y)};
6: end for;
7: Sort Y ∗ := [0,m− 1] w.r.t. the element of A;
8: pi := (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(m− 1));
9: for each integer i ∈ [0,m− 1] do
10: pi(i) := y(i+k) (mod m) (mod m), where
y(i+k) (mod m) is the (i + k) (mod m)-th element of
the ordered (m, p)-complete set (Y ∗, ≺˜)
11: end for;
12: Output pi as the (m, p)-complete S-box σ(p, t6R(p, Ci),≺,
Y, k).
Lemma 6. For an ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺), where b =
t6R(p, Ci) for some t ∈ [1, (p − 1)/2] and i ∈ {1, 2}, an
(m, p)-complete set Y and a non-negative integer k ≤ m− 1,
the (m, p)-complete S-box σ(p, b,≺, Y, k) can be computed in
O(m logm) time and O(m) space by using Algorithm 2.
Proof. There is a for-loop over the set Y of size m for
finding x-coordinate for each element y ∈ Y over the MEC
Ep,t6R(p,Ci). Note that at line 4 of Algorithm 2, x can
be computed in constant time, i.e., O(1). This is due to
Theorem 1 the MEC Ep,b has each element of [0, p − 1]
uniquely as y-coordinate. Thus, the for-loop over Y can be
computed in O(m). The remaining part of Algorithm 2 takes
O(m logm) time. Hence, with the aid of the property of
O notion, Algorithm 2 takes O(m logm) time. Moreover,
Algorithm 2 stores only a set of size m, other than inputs,
and therefore its space complexity is O(m). 
Note that using Algorithm 2 is practical, since Lemma 4
implies that for a given ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺) we can
generate a large number of (m, p)-complete S-boxes. How-
ever, Ep,R(p,Ci), where i ∈ {1, 2}, R(p, Ci) and t−1 for
t ∈ [0, (p − 1)/2] should be given as input for Algorithm 2.
We know that R(p, C1) = 1, now the next important question
is how to find the representative R(p, C2) for the class C2 of
MECs. For this we prove the following results.
Lemma 7. An MEC Ep,b is an element of the class C1 if
and only if there exists an integer y ∈ [1, p − 1] such that
(0, y) ∈ Ep,b.
Proof. Consider the MEC Ep,1. Then for y = 1 the equation
x3 + 1 ≡ 1 (mod p) is satisfied by x = 0. This implies that
(0, 1) ∈ Ep,1, and hence the required statement is true for the
MEC Ep,1. Let Ep,b ∈ C1, where b ∈ [2, p − 1]. Then there
exists an isomorphism parameter t ∈ [1, (p − 1)/2] between
Ep,1 and Ep,b such that (t20, t31) = (0, t3) ∈ Ep,b. Hence,
for each MEC Ep,b ∈ C1 there exists an integer y ∈ [1, p− 1]
such that (0, y) ∈ Ep,b.
To prove the converse, suppose on contrary that there is an
MEC Ep,b with a point (0, y) for some y ∈ [1, p − 1] and
Ep,b /∈ C1. This implies that there does not exist an integer
t ∈ [1, (p− 1)/2] such that b ≡ t6 (mod p). Thus, b 6≡ (t3)2
(mod p) for all t ∈ [1, (p−1)/2]. But it follows from (0, y) ∈
Ep,b that b ≡ y2 (mod p) for some y ∈ [1, (p− 1)/2] which
is a contradiction. Hence Ep,b ∈ C1. 
Lemma 8. For a prime p, the representative R(p, C2) of the
class C2 is a QNR integer in the field Fp.
Proof. Let Ep,b ∈ C2. Suppose on contrary that b is a quadratic
integer in the field Fp, i.e., b ≡ y2 (mod p) for some integer
y ∈ [1, p − 1]. It follows from the equation x3 + b ≡ y2
(mod p) that (0, y) ∈ Ep,b. By Lemma 7, it holds that Ep,b ∈
5C1, which is a contradiction to our assumption. So, b is a QNR,
and hence R(p, C2) is a QNR. 
Euler’s Criterion is a well-known method to test if a non-
zero element of the field Fp is a QR or not. We state this test
in Lemma 9.
Lemma 9. [33, p. 1797] An element q ∈ Fp is a QR if and
only if q(p−1)/2 ≡ −1 (mod p).
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON
In this section, a detailed analysis of the proposed S-
box is performed. Most of the cryptosystems use 8 × 8 S-
boxes and therefore, we use 8 × 8 (256, 525211)-complete
S-box σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) given in Table II generated by the
proposed method for experiments. The cryptographic proper-
ties of the proposed S-box are also compared with some of
the well-known S-boxes developed by different mathematical
structures.
A. Linear Attacks
Linear attacks are used to exploit linear relationship between
input and output bits. A cryptographically strong S-box is the
one which can strongly resist linear attacks. The resistance
of an S-box against linear attacks is evaluated by well-
known tests including non-linearity [35], linear approximation
probability [36] and algebraic complexity [37]. For a bijective
n×n S-box S, the non-linearity NL(S), linear approximation
probability LAP(S) can be computed by Eqs. (1) and (2), re-
spectively, while its algebraic complexity AC(S) is measured
by the number of non-zero terms in its linearized algebraic
expression [38].
NL(S) = min
α,β,λ
{x ∈ Fn2 : α · S(x) 6= β · x⊕ λ}, (1)
LAP(S) =
1
2n
{
max
α,β
{|#{x ∈ Fn2 |
x · α = S(x) · β} − 2n−1|}},
(2)
where α ∈ Fn2 , λ ∈ F2, β ∈ Fn2\{0} and “·” represents the
inner product over F2.
An S-box S is said to be highly resistive against linear
attacks if it has NL close to 2n−1 − 2(n/2)−1, low LAP and
AC close to 2n − 1.
The experimental results of NL, LAP and AC of the
proposed S-box σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) and some of the well-
known S-boxes are given in Table III. Note that the proposed
S-box has NL, LAP and AC close to the optimal values.
The NL of σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) is greater than that of the S-
boxes in [6], [16], [19]–[21], [26], [32], [39]–[44] and equal
to that of [2]. The LAP of σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) is less than
that of the S-boxes in [6], [16], [19]–[21], [26], [32], [39]–
[44], and the AC of σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) attains the optimal
value, which is 255. Thus the proposed method is capable
of generating S-boxes with optimal resistance against linear
attacks as compared to some of the existing well-known S-
boxes.
B. Differential Attack
In this attack, cryptanalysts try to approximate the original
message by observing a particular difference in output bits for
a given input bits difference. The strength of an n×n S-box S
can be measured by calculating its differential approximation
probability DAP(S) using Eq. (3).
DAP(S) =
1
2n
{
max
∆x,∆y
{
#{x ∈ Fn2 |
S(x⊕∆x) = S(x)⊕∆y}}}, (3)
where 4x, 4y ∈ Fn2 , and “⊕” denotes bit-wise addition over
F2.
An S-box S is highly secure against differential attack if its
DAP is close to 1/2n. In Table III, the DAP of σ(52511, 1, N,
Y, 0) and other existing S-boxes is given. Note that the DAP
of the proposed S-box σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) is 0.016 which is
close to the optimal value 0.0039. Furthermore, it is evident
from Table III that the DAP of the proposed S-box is less than
the S-boxes in [6], [16], [19]–[21], [26], [32], [39]–[44], and
hence the proposed S-box scheme can generate S-boxes with
high resistance against differential attack.
C. Analysis of Boolean Functions
It is necessary to analyze the boolean functions of a given
S-box to measure its confusion/diffusion creation capability.
For an n×n S-box, strict avalanche criterion SAC(S) and bit
independence criterion BIC(S) are used to analyze its boolean
functions. The SAC(S) and the BIC(S) are computed by two
matrices M(S) = [mij ] and B(S) = [bij ], respectively, such
that
mij =
1
2n
∑
x∈Fn2
w
(
Si(x⊕ αj)⊕ Si(x)
) , (4)
and
bij =
1
2n
( ∑
x∈Fn2
1≤r 6=i≤n
w
(
Si(x⊕ αj)⊕ Si(x)⊕
Sr(x+ αj)⊕ Sr(x)
))
,
(5)
where w(y) is the hamming weight of y, αj ∈ Fn2 such
that w(αj) = 1, Si and Sr are i-th and r-th boolean
functions of S, respectively, and 1 ≤ i, j, r ≤ n. An S-box
S satisfies the SAC and the BIC if each non-diagonal entry
of M(S) and B(S) have value close to 0.5. The maximum
and minimum values of the SAC (resp., BIC) of the proposed
S-box σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) are 0.563 and 0.438 (resp., 0.521
and 0.479). Note that these values are closed to 0.5, and hence
the proposed S-box satisfies the SAC and the BIC. Similarly,
the SAC and the BIC of some other S-boxes are listed in
Table III and compared with the results of the proposed S-
box. It is evident from Table III that the proposed S-box can
generate more confusion and diffusion as compared to some
of the listed S-boxes.
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COMPARISON OF THE PROPOSED AND OTHER EXISTING S-BOXES
S-boxes Type Linear DAP Analysis of
of Attacks Boolean Functions
S-box NL LAP AC SAC SAC BIC BIC
(max) (min) (max) (min)
Ref. [41] 102 0.133 254 0.039 0.562 0.359 0.535 0.467
Ref. [26] other 108 0.133 255 0.039 0.563 0.493 0.545 0.475
Ref. [2] 112 0.062 09 0.016 0.562 0.453 0.504 0.480
Ref. [44] 108 0.156 255 0.046 0.502 0.406 0.503 0.47
Ref. [21] 108 0.145 255 0.039 0.578 0.406 0.531 0.470
Ref. [40] 103 0.132 255 0.039 0.570 0.398 0.535 0.472
Ref. [19] Chaos 100 0.129 255 0.039 0.594 0.422 0.525 0.477
Ref. [20] 100 0.152 255 0.039 0.586 0.391 0.537 0.468
Ref. [43] 110 0.125 255 0.039 0.562 0.438 0.555 0.473
Ref. [42] 74 0.211 253 0.055 0.688 0.109 0.551 0.402
Ref. [39] 104 0.145 255 0.039 0.625 0.391 0.531 0.471
Ref. [6] 106 0.148 254 0.039 0.578 0.437 0.535 0.464
Ref. [32] EC 106 0.188 253 0.039 0.609 0.406 0.527 0.465
Ref. [16] 106 0.148 255 0.039 0.641 0.406 0.537 0.471
σ(52511, 1, N, Y, 0) 112 0.063 255 0.016 0.563 0.438 0.521 0.479
D. Distinct S-boxes
An S-box generator is useful to resist cryptanalysis if it
can generate a large number of distinct S-boxes [16]. For the
parameters p = 263, b = 1,m = 256 and k = 0 the number
of (256, 263)-complete S-boxes Num(E263,1, 256, 0) is 128.
It turned out with the computational results that all of these
(256, 263)-complete S-boxes are distinct. However this is not
the case in general.
An (m, p)-complete S-box σ(p, b,≺, Y, k) is said to be a
natural (m, p)-complete S-box if Y = [0,m− 1]. For a prime
p and ordering ≺, let p∗ denote the largest integer such that
p∗ ≤ p−1 and there exists at least two ordered MECs (Ep,b1)
and Ep,b2 due to which the natural (p
∗, p)-complete S-boxes
are identical, i.e., for any fixed m ≥ p∗ the number of natural
(m, p)-complete S-boxes due to all ordered MECs with prime
p, ordering ≺ and k = 0 is equal to p − 1. A plot of primes
p ∈ [11, 7817] and the integers p∗ is given in Fig. 1, where
the underlying ordering is the natural ordering N . For the
orderings D and M , such plots are similar as that of N . It
is evident from Fig. 1, that with the increase in the value of
prime, there is no significant increase in the value of p∗ and
the largest value of p∗ for these primes is 12. Hence, for each
of these primes, each m ≥ 13 and k = 0, we can get p − 1
distinct natural (m, p)-complete S-boxes with k = 0.
Lemma 10. Let ≺ be a fixed total order on all MECs in C1
such that for each MEC Ep,b ∈ C1 it holds that the points
(0,±y), where −y is additive inverse of y in Fp, have indices
from the set {1, 2} in the sequence representation of the MEC.
Then for a fixed integer k ∈ [0,m− 1], the number of distinct
natural (m, p)-complete S-boxes generated by all MECs in C1
are at least {
m− 1 if m < (p− 1)/2
(p− 1)/2 otherwise. (6)
Proof. Let Ep,b be an MEC in C1, where b ∈ [1, p− 1]. Then
by Lemma 7, (0, y) ∈ Ep,b for some y ∈ [1, p − 1]. Further
by the fact that if (x, z) ∈ Ep,b then (x,−z) ∈ Ep,b, where
−z is the additive inverse of z in the field Fp, implies that
(0,±y) ∈ Ep,b. Moreover, by the group theoretic argument
exactly one of the integers y and −y belongs to the interval
[0, (p − 1)/2]. Hence, for a fixed k ∈ [0,m − 1] and the
natural (m, p)-complete S-box σ(p, b,≺, Y, k) it holds that
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Fig. 1. Plot of primes p and their corresponding largest integers p∗
σ(p, b,≺, Y, k)(k) ∈ {±y} if (0,±y) have indices from the
set {1, 2} in the sequence representation of Ep,b. Note that a
point (0, z) cannot appear on two different MECs Ep,b1 and
Ep,b2 , otherwise this implies that b1 = b2. Thus, for any two
MECs Ep,b1 , Ep,b2 in C1 satisfying the conditions given in
the lemma it holds that the natural (m, p)-complete S-boxes
σ(p, b1,≺, Y, k) and σ(p, b2,≺, Y, k) have different images at
a fixed input k ∈ [0,m − 1]. Thus |C1| = (p − 1)/2 implies
the required result. 
For three different primes p distinct S-boxes are generated
by the proposed method, and compared with the existing
schemes over ECs as shown in Table IV. It is evident that the
proposed S-box generator performs better than other schemes.
TABLE IV
COMPARISON OF THE NUMBER OF DISTINCT 8× 8 S-BOXES GENERATED
BY DIFFERENT SCHEMES
p 1889 2111 2141
b 1888 1 7
Distinct S-boxes by the N 32768† 32768† 32768†
proposed method due to D 31744† 32704† 30720†
the ordering M 15360† 26748† 21504†
N 944 1055 1070
Distinct S-boxes by Ref. [32] D 944 1055 1070
M 944 1055 1070
Distinct S-boxes by Ref. [6] 50 654 663
Distinct S-boxes by Ref. [39] 1 1 1
E. Fixed Point Test
An S-box construction scheme is cryptographically good
if the average number of fixed points in the constructed S-
boxes is as small as possible [16]. The average number of
fixed points of the above generated S-boxes are shown in
The number h† stands for an integer greater than h.
7Table V. The experimental results indicate that the proposed
S-box generator generates S-boxes with a very small number
of fixed points. Furthermore, the average number of fixed
points in the proposed S-boxes are comparable with that of
the existing schemes over ECs.
TABLE V
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE NUMBER OF THE FIXED POINTS IN THE
S-BOXES GENERATED BY DIFFERENT SCHEMES
p 1889 2111 2141
b 1888 1 7
Avg. # fixed points by the N 1.1298 1.0844 1.0972
proposed method due to D 0.9471 0.8569 0.9393
the ordering M 0.8361 1.1847 1.0025
N 1.77 0.9735 0.9785
Avg. # fixed points by Ref. [32] D 1.932 0.9716 0.9561
M 1.332 1.0019 1.0150
Avg. # fixed points by Ref. [6] 2.04 0.8976 0.9351
Avg. # fixed points by Ref. [39] 2 3 0
F. Correlation Test
The correlation test is used to analyze the relationship
among the S-boxes generated by any scheme. A robust scheme
generates S-boxes with low correlation [16]. The proposed
method is evaluated by determining the correlation coefficients
(CCs) of the designed S-boxes. The lower and upper bounds
for their CCs are listed in Table VI, which reveal that the
proposed scheme is capable of constructing S-boxes with very
low correlation as compared to the other schemes over ECs.
TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF CCS OF S-BOXES GENERATED BY DIFFERENT SCHEMES
Scheme p b Ordering Correlation
Lower Average Upper
1889 1888 N -0.2685 0.0508 0.2753
Proposed 1889 1888 D -0.2263 0.0523 0.2986
1889 1888 M -0.2817 0.0506 0.2902
2111 1 N -0.2718 0.0504 0.2600
Proposed 2111 1 D -0.2596 0.0531 0.3025
2111 1 M -0.2779 0.0507 0.2684
2141 7 N -0.2682 0.0503 0.2666
Proposed 2141 7 D -0.2565 0.0517 0.2890
2141 7 M -0.2744 0.0503 0.2858
1889 1888 N -0.2782 0.0503 0.2756
Ref. [32] 1889 1888 D -0.4637 -0.0503 0.2879
1889 1888 M -0.2694 0.0501 0.4844
2111 1 N -0.2597 0.0504 0.2961
Ref. [32] 2111 1 D -0.3679 0.0500 0.3996
2111 1 M -0.2720 0.0499 0.3019
2141 7 N -0.2984 0.0500 0.3301
Ref. [32] 2141 7 D -0.2661 0.0500 0.2639
2141 7 M -0.2977 0.0501 0.2975
Ref. [6] 1889 1888 – -0.0025 0.2322 0.9821
Ref. [6] 2111 1 – -0.2932 0.0785 0.9988
Ref. [6] 2141 7 – -0.2723 0.0629 0.9999
G. Time and Space Complexity
For a good S-box generator it is necessary to have low
time and space complexity [16]. Time and space complexity
of the newly proposed method are compared with some of
the existing methods in Table VII. It follows that for a fixed
prime the proposed method can generate an S-box with low
complexity and space as compared to other listed schemes.
This fact makes the proposed S-box generator more efficient
and practical.
TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF TIME AND SPACE COMPLEXITY OF DIFFERENT S-BOX
GENERATORS OVER ECS
S-box Ref. [39] Ref. [6] Ref. [32] Proposed method
Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
Time complexity O(p2) O(p2) O(mp) O(mp) O(m logm)
Space complexity O(p) O(p) O(m) O(m) O(m)
V. THE PROPOSED RANDOM NUMBERS GENERATION
SCHEME
For an ordered MEC (Ep,b,≺), a subset A ⊆ [0, p− 1], an
integer m ∈ [1, |A|] and a non-negative integer k ∈ [0,m−1],
we define a sequence of pseudo random numbers (SPRNs)
γ(p, b,≺, A,m, k) to be a sequence of length |A| whose i-
th term is defined as γ(p, b,≺, A,m, k)(i) = y(i+k) (mod m)
(mod m), where y(i+k) (mod m) is the (i + k) (mod m)-th
element of the ordered set (A,≺∗) in its sequence represen-
tation.
One of the differences in the definition of an (m, p)-complete
S-box and the proposed SPRNs is that an (m, p)-complete set
is required as an input for the S-box generation, since an S-box
of length m is a permutation on the set [0,m−1]. Furthermore,
Algorithm 1 and 2 can be used for the generation of the
proposed SPRNs, however, we propose an other algorithm
which is more efficient than Algorithm 2 for its generation.
This new algorithm is also based on Observation 5, but there
is no constraint on A to be an (m, p)-complete set, and hence
we can generate all proposed SPRNs for a given prime p by
using Ep,R(p,Ci), where i ∈ {1, 2}.
Algorithm 3 Constructing the proposed SPRNs using EC
isomorphism
Input: An MEC Ep,R(p,Ci), where i ∈ {1, 2}, an integer t ∈
[1, (p − 1)/2], a total order ≺ on the MEC Ep,t6R(p,Ci)
and a subset Y ⊆ [0, p− 1].
Output: The proposed SPRNs γ(p, t6R(p, Ci),≺, t3Y,m, k).
1: A := ∅; /*A set containing the points of Ep,t6R(p,Ci) with
y-coordinates from the set t3Y */
2: for each y ∈ Y do
3: Find x ∈ [0, p− 1] such that (x, y) ∈ Ep,R(p,Ci);
4: A := A ∪ {(t2x, t3y)};
5: end for;
6: Sort A w.r.t. the element of the total order ≺∗;
7: pi := (pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(|A| − 1));
8: for each integer i ∈ [0, |A| − 1] do
9: pi(i) := a(i+k) (mod m) (mod m), where
a(i+k) (mod m) is the (i + k) (mod m)-th element of
the ordered set (A,≺∗)
10: end for;
11: Output pi as the proposed SPRN γ(p, t6R(p, Ci),≺
, t3Y,m, k)
8Note that the time and space complexity of Algorithm 3
are O(|A| log |A|) and O(|A|) respectively as obtained for
Algorithm 2. However, Algorithm 3 does not require t−1 as
an input parameter to compute γ(p, t6R(p, Ci),≺, t3Y,m, k)
for which we need preprocessing. Furthermore, Lemma 10
trivially holds for our proposed SPRNs. This implies that
the proposed PRNG can generate a large number of distinct
SPRNs for a given prime.
VI. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SPRNS METHOD
We applied some well-known tests to analyze the strength
of our proposed SPRNs. A brief introduction to these tests and
their experimental results are given below. We used orderings
N,D and M for these tests.
A. Histogram and Entropy Test
Histogram and entropy are the two widely used tests to
measure the extent of randomness of a RNG. For a sequence
X over the set of symbols Ω, the histogram of X is a function
fX over Ω such that for each w ∈ Ω, fX(w) is equal to
the number of occurrences of w in X . We call fX(w), the
frequency of w in X . A sequence X has uniform histogram
if all elements of its symbol set have same frequency. The
histogram test is a generalization of the Monobit test included
in NIST STS [45]. A sequence is said to be highly random if
it has a uniformly distributed histogram.
Shannon [46] introduced the concept of entropy. For a
sequence X over the set of symbols Ω, the entropy H(X)
of X is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
w∈Ω
fX(w)
|X| log2(
fX(w)
|X| ). (7)
The upper bound for the entropy is log2(|Ω|). The higher is the
value of entropy of a sequence the higher is the randomness
in the sequence.
Remark 11. For any distinct k1, k2 ∈ [0,m − 1], the
histograms of the proposed SPRNs γ(p, b,≺, A,m, k1) and
γ(p, b,≺, A,m, k2) are the same, and hence H(γ(p, b,≺,
A,m, k1)) = H(γ(p, b,≺, A,m, k2)).
In the next lemmas we discuss when the proposed SPRNs
has uniformly distributed histogram and its entropy approaches
the optimal value.
Lemma 12. For an (m, p)-complete set A, a positive integer
h ≤ m such that m = hq + r, a non-negative integer k ≤ h,
and the SPRNs X = γ(p, b,≺, A, h, k) it holds that
(i)
fX(w) =
{
q + 1 if w ∈ [0, r − 1],
q otherwise,
if r 6= 0 and A = [0,m− 1],
(ii) for each w ∈ [0, h− 1], fX(w) = q if r = 0.
Proof. It is trivial that the domain of the histogram of X is
the set [0, h− 1].
(i) If r 6= 0 and A = [0,m− 1], then it can be easily verified
that A can be partitioned in q+1 sets {ih+` | 0 ≤ ` ≤ h−1},
where 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, and {qh + ` | 0 ≤ ` ≤ r − 1}. This
implies that for each w ∈ [0, h− 1] it holds that
fX(w) =
{
q + 1 if w ∈ [0, r − 1],
q otherwise.
(ii) If r = 0, then m = hq. We know that for each a ∈ A, it
holds that a = mi+ j, where 0 ≤ j ≤ m− 1. Thus, with the
fact that m = hq, it holds that
a (mod h) = ((mi) (mod h) + j (mod h))
= j (mod h)
This implies that {a (mod m) | a ∈ A} = {(a (mod m))
(mod h) | a ∈ A}. Thus by using the same reason, we can
partition A into q sets, since m = hq, and hence fX(w) = q
for each w ∈ [0, h− 1]. This completes the proof. 
For the parameters given in Lemma 12, we can deduce that
the histogram of our proposed SPRNs is either approximately
uniform or exactly uniform.
Corollary 13. Let A be an (m, p)-complete set, h ≤ m such
that m = hq + r be a positive integer, k ≤ m − 1 be a
non-negative integer, and X be the proposed SPRNs γ(p, b,≺,
A, h, k). It holds that
H(X ) =

−r( q+1|X| )log2( q+1|X | )− if r 6= 0, A = [0,m− 1],
(h− r)( q|X| )log2( q|X | )
log2(h) if r = 0.
(8)
Proof. When r 6= 0 and A = [0,m−1], then by Lemma 12 (i),
there are r (resp., h−r) numbers in [0, h−1] whose frequency
is q + 1 (resp., q), and therefore we have the result.
When r = 0, then by Lemma 12 (ii), all numbers in [0, h− 1]
have frequency q and there are h elements in [0, h − 1] and
hence the result. 
To test the efficiency of the proposed PRNG, we gen-
erated SPRNs X1 = γ(52511, 1, N,A, 127, 0), X2 =
γ(52511, 1, N,A, 16, 0), where A is the set given in Ta-
ble I, X3 = γ(101, 35, N, [0, 100], 6, 0) and X4 =
γ(3917, 301, N, [0, 3916], 3917, 0). The histogram of X1 is
given in Fig. 2 which is approximately uniform, while by
Lemma 12 the histograms of X3 and X4 are uniformly dis-
tributed. Furthermore, the entropy of each of these SPRNs is
listed in Table VIII. Observe that the newly generated SPRNs
have entropy close to the optimal value. Thus, by histogram
and entropy test it is evident that the proposed method can gen-
erate highly random SPRNs. Moreover, the proposed SPRNs
X4 are compared with the SPRNs R(3917, 0, 301, 10, 2)
generated by the existing technique due to Hayat [6] over
ECs. By Lemma 12 it holds that fX4(w) = 1 for each
w ∈ [0, 3916], and by Fig. 3, it is clear that the histogram
of X4 is more uniform as compared to that of the SPRNs
R(3917, 0, 301, 10, 2). By Table VIII, the entropy of X4 is
also higher than that of R(3917, 0, 301, 10, 2), and hence the
proposed PRNG is better than the generator due to Hayat [6].
9TABLE VIII
COMPARISON OF ENTROPY AND PERIOD OF DIFFERENT SEQUENCE OF
RANDOM NUMBERS OVER EC
Random sequence X Type of A H(X) log2(|Ω|) Period Optimal
period
γ(52511, 1, N,A, 127, 0) Table I 6.6076 6.7814 256 256
γ(52511, 1, N,A, 16, 0) Table I 4 4 256 256
γ(101, 35, N,A, 6, 0) [0, 100] 2.5846 2.5850 99 101
γ(3917, 301, N,A, 3917, 0) [0, 3916] 11.9355 11.9355 3917 3917
R(3917, 0, 301, 10, 2) Ref. [6] – 10.9465 11.1536 3917 3917
Fig. 2. The histogram of γ(52511, 1, N, Y, 127, 0)
Fig. 3. The histogram of R(3917, 0, 301, 10, 2)
B. Period Test
Period test is another important test to analyze the ran-
domness of a PRNG. A sequence X = {an} is said to be
periodic if it repeats itself after a fixed number of integers, i.e.,
{an+h} = {an} for the least positive integer h. In this case h
is called the period of the sequence X . The maximum period
that a sequence X can have is |X|. The sequence X is said to
be highly random if its period is long enough [47]. We com-
puted the period of the proposed SPRNs Xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , 4
and the SPRNs R(3917, 0, 301, 10, 2) generated by the scheme
proposed in [6] and the results are listed in Table VIII. It is
evident from Table VIII that the proposed SPRNs have period
colse to the optimal value. Hence, the proposed PRNG can
generated highly random numbers.
C. Time and Space Complexity
It is necessary for a good PRNG to have low time and space
complexity. The time and space complexity of the proposed
PRNG and the generator proposed by Hayat et al. [6] are
compared in Table IX. Note that the time and space complexity
of the proposed PRNG depend on the size of the input
set, while the time and space complexity of PRNG due to
Hayat et al. [6] are O(p2) and O(p), respectively, where p is
underlying prime. Hence, the proposed PRNG is more efficient
as compared to the PRNG due to Hayat et al. [6].
TABLE IX
COMPARISON OF TIME AND SPACE COMPLEXITY OF DIFFERENT PRNGS
OVER ECS
Input size m Ref. [6] Proposed method
Time complexity
m < p
m = p
O(p2) O(|A| log |A|)
Space complexity
m < p
m = p
O(p) O(|A|)
VII. CONCLUSION
Novel S-box generator and PRNG are presented based on
a special class of the ordered MECs. Furthermore, efficient
algorithms are also presented to implement the proposed
generators. The security strength of these generators is tested
by applying several well-known security tests. Experimental
results and comparison reveal that the proposed generators are
capable of generating highly secure S-boxes and PRNs as com-
pared to some of the exiting commonly used cryptosystems in
low time and space complexity.
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